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Genitive of Negation and Scope of Negation  
in Russian Existential Sentences1 
Barbara H. Partee, University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
Vladimir Borschev, VINITI, Russian Academy of Sciences  
 
0 Introduction 
As noted by Brown (1999), there is general agreement in the 
literature on Russian “genitive of negation” (GenNeg) that GenNeg 
occurs only when the NP in question is within the scope of 
sentential negation (NEG). The apparent optionality of GenNeg 
within the scope of negation is a point of difficulty, with authors 
divided about whether the choice between Genitive and 
Nominative or Accusative in such cases is accompanied by some 
difference in syntactic structure and/or in semantics or pragmatics.  
A typical illustration of the correlation of Gen/Nom with scope 
of negation (underlined), is the classic example (1a-b): 
(1) a. Moroz                 ne      cuvstvovalsja .   
  Frost-NOM.M.SG NEG be.felt-M.SG  
  ‘The frost was not felt.’       
 b. Moroza               ne      cuvstvovalos’.  
  Frost- GEN.M .SG NEG be.felt-N.SG 
  ‘No frost was felt (there was no frost).’ (Babby 1980 p.59) 
                                                 
 1 We are grateful for valuable discussions and comments on the genitive of 
negation to Jurij Apresjan, Leonard Babby, John Bailyn, Wayles Browne, Maria 
Nella Carminati, Catherine Chvany, Östen Dahl, Nomi Erteschik-Shir, Hana 
Filip, Eva Hajicová, Uwe Junghanns, Knud Lambrecht, Fred Landman, Elena 
Paducheva, Asya Pereltsvaig, David Perlmutter, Ellen Prince, Ekaterina 
Rakhilina, Petr Sgall, Andreas Spaeth, Anita Steube, Leonard Talmy, and Tanya 
Yanko. Valuable comments on the present paper were received from Olga 
Arnaudova, Loren Billings, Wayles Browne, Angelika Kratzer, Ora 
Matushansky, Roumyana Pancheva,  and Yakov Testelets.  
 This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under 
Grant No. BCS-9905748 to the authors for the collaborative project “Integration 
of Lexical & Compositional Semantics: Genitives in English and Russian”.   
    
Restricting attention to intransitive sentences, we offer new 
examples that challenge common theories of the relation between 
GenNeg and the scope of NEG. These examples suggest arguments 
for the following points, with necessary caveats because of the 
theory-dependence of central notions.   
(A) The biconditional [GenNeg « in scope of NEG] is too strong.  
(B) The implication does hold one-way: [GenNeg ® in scope of 
NEG].  
(C) Nominative ni-phrase subjects, which are necessarily under the 
scope of NEG, are possible, but have obligatorily partitive or 
other “strong” interpretations. There is a systematic difference 
between nominative and genitive ni-phrase subjects, but it is 
not a difference in scope of negation.  
(D) In order to maintain even (B), an account of the apparent 
“licensing paradox” concerning the cego-nibud’ examples in 
section 5 must be found. 
1 Previous claims about GenNeg and scope of negation 
1.1. The stronger claim: [GenNeg «  in scope of NEG]  
In this formulation we abstract away from well-known and 
uncontroversial factors such as the structural case requirement. 
And we consider only “subject” genitives; we are agnostic about 
the role of unaccusativity, and about unification of subject and 
object genitives. 
Babby (1980) is a prime exponent of this strongest claim 
(although he hedges it at certain points.) He takes occurrence in the 
scope of NEG to be the heart of the usage of GenNeg. Babby’s 
final formulation2 of his rule of genitive marking in NES’s is (2): 
                                                 
2 Babby’s terminology: NES, AES, NDS, ADS: N(egated)/A(ffirmative 
E(xistential)/D(eclarative) Sentence. 
    
(2)                      NEG  
   [Rheme V NP]      Þ       [ ne V NPgen]    (Babby’s (160)) 
  Conditions:  (a) NP is indefinite    
              (b) V is semantically empty   
But Babby actually makes slightly conflicting statements on 
this point. In his central chapter 3 on the subject, “Genitive 
Marking and the Scope of Negation”, he says: 
The key to understanding the “genitive of negation” in general, 
and genitive subject NP marking in particular, can be stated as 
follows: 
/78/ In Russian, an NP in a negated sentence 
can be marked with the genitive case if and 
only if it is in the scope of negation.  
…. It is only in NES’s that the subject NP falls in the scope of 
negation; thus it is only in NES’s that the subject NP is marked 
genitive. (Babby 1980: 69) 
 Footnote 10 to Chapter 3: … I would like to emphasize once 
again that /78/ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
genitive marking to operate, i.e., all NPs marked genitive in 
Russian negated sentences must be in the scope of negation, but 
it is not the case that all NP’s in the scope of negation are 
marked genitive. There are a number of other conditions that 
must be satisfied if an NP in the scope of negation is to be 
marked genitive. (Babby 1980: 76) 
There are various ways that Babby’s “if and only if” condition 
may be read. As we understand Babby, he means that when the 
additional conditions are met, the rule is obligatory within the 
scope of negation. An eligible NP that stays nominative is an NP 
that is in the Theme, and is hence not under the scope of negation. 
Recent syntactic proposals implementing the idea that genitives 
are under the scope of negation and nominatives are not include 
Babyonyshev (1996), Bailyn (1997), Brown (1999), and Babby 
(2000). 
    
1.2. The weaker claim:  [GenNeg ®  in scope of NEG] 
As noted above, as we interpret Babby (1980), he is a proponent of 
the stronger claim, hedged only by the need to observe the 
additional requirements of structural case, etc.  
Other authors have more explicitly endorsed the weaker claim. 
While Bailyn (1997) sets as his central task the design of a 
structure within which GenNeg will be obligatory when its 
conditions are met, he prefaces his analysis with discussion of the 
widespread view of GenNeg as syntactically optional but 
influenced by a range of semantic and pragmatic factors. 
Descriptively, direct objects normally marked Accusative can 
appear in the Genitive case under the scope of sentential negation, 
but need not. … Similarly, unaccusative subjects can appear in the 
GenNeg under negation, but need not. … Derived subjects of 
passives also can appear in the GenNeg, but need not. Bailyn 
(1997) pp. 85-86. 
Bailyn cites a number of authors who have made the weaker 
claim, including Dahl (1969), Timberlake (1986), and Gundel:  
Genitive placement is optional, and generally does not apply if and 
only if the NP to which it would apply is the topic (or coreferential 
with the topic) of the sentence. Gundel (1974, 1988, p.190) 
Babby’s (1980) views can be read as an argument for 
recognizing the syntactic importance of Theme-Rheme structure, a 
position also espoused in Prague linguistics (Sgall et al. 1986). On 
Babby’s approach, the factors concerning the extent of the 
individuation of the nominal which Timberlake cites as increasing 
the likelihood of a nominal receiving GenNeg are factors 
increasing the likelihood of its being part of the Rheme. This is 
also the position we followed in Borschev and Partee (1998a).  
2 Scope of negation and presupposition  
Some of the difficulty surrounding the appropriate form of the 
condition may be due to unclarity about the scope of NEG. On the 
    
one hand, all agree that the relevant kind of negation is “sentential 
negation”, and not “constituent” negation, which is well known 
NOT to trigger GenNeg. Babby (1980) gives the following 
minimal pair: constituent negation in (3a) does not trigger GenNeg, 
sentential NEG in (3b) does. See also Boguslavskij (1985). 
(3) a. U nego v rukax  ne  slovar’. 
     at him  in hands NEG dictionary-NOM 
  ‘It isn’t a dictionary that he has in his hands.’ 
   b. U nego v rukax  net   slovarja. 
     at him  in hands NEG.is dictionary-GEN 
  ‘He doesn’t have a dictionary in his hands.’ 
 But there are difficult issues concerning the scope of sentential 
negation and the question of “what gets negated”. Even if negation 
has some parts of a sentence under its scope while other parts are 
“higher” in the tree and thus outside its scope, that is not the whole 
story. Among Russian linguists, it is common in the analysis of 
Nom/Gen pairs under negation to put more weight on the 
difference in ‘referential status’ of the NP. Ickovic (1974) cites a 
striking case described by Peškovskij (1956): (translating) 
“Considering the conditions under which the expression Ni odin 
groš ne byl u menja v karmane ‘[lit:] Not one grosh-NOM NEG was 
at me in the pocket’ “becomes more possible”, A.M. Pešjkovskij 
writes: “Ni odnogo groša ne bylo ‘Not one grosh-GEN NEG was’ 
denotes moneylessness, and groši ‘groshes’ themselves play no 
role here. Ni odin groš ne byl ‘Not one grosh-NOM NEG was’ means 
that not one of those groši which were being spoken about earlier 
was [in my pocket], although perhaps there were rubles, even 
thousands of rubles” (Peškovskij 1956, (3rd ed. 1928) p. 326).” We 
return to examples like Peškovskij’s in Section 4. 
The idea of the importance of definiteness in GenNeg goes 
back at least to Peškovskij and to Jakobson (1936/1971). 
Contemporary Russian semanticists have subtle analyses of 
referential status (a classic work is Paduceva (1985)), and are often 
inclined to see sentential negation as having the whole sentence in 
    
its scope, with further differences attributed to semantic and 
pragmatic properties of the constituents under its scope. 
These ideas relate to the well-known fact that presuppositions 
can affect “what is negated” in a negative sentence. Specific 
indefinites, referential uses of definite descriptions, and the 
presence of presupposition- inducing constructions can all cause an 
element structurally within the scope of negation to be interpreted 
“as if” it were outside the scope of negation. Thus an expression 
like a certain friend of mine or the man who just walked in, nearly 
always used “referentially”, normally carries a presupposition of 
existence even if it occurs within a phrase that is clearly within the 
scope of negation. Such presuppositions, including ones relating to 
the referentiality of NPs, may come from a number of sources, 
internal or external to the NP itself.  
 It has often been noted that in a negated subject-predicate 
sentence, the subject is likely to be presupposed to exist, and what 
is denied is that the predicate holds of it. Prague school linguists 
take the presuppositionality of Topic or Theme as more 
fundamental. Babby 1980 identifies ‘being in the Theme’ as ‘being 
outside the scope of negation’. In Babby 2000, he interprets ‘being 
outside the scope of negation’ in terms of a syntactic structure in 
which themes are always in a position higher than NEG. An 
alternative possibility would be to say that being in the Theme 
directly contributes a presupposition, in the manner of Peregrin 
(1995), without assuming that there is a specific syntactic position 
for Theme material. We remain agnostic about the syntax, but want 
to argue that there are indeed cases where Gen/Nom alternations 
depend crucially on presuppositionality within the scope of NEG, 
including the examples of nominative nikto ‘no one’ in Section 4. 
Before presenting our examples in Sections 4 and 5, we briefly 
summarize in Section 3 some ideas about “Perspective Structure” 
presented in Borschev and Partee (to appear), with the help of 
which we will discuss these examples and others to try to find what 
they all have in common if not differences in scope of negation.   
    
3 Perspective structure and presuppositions of existence  
3.1 Existential sentences 
There is a distinction, discussed by many authors in many 
frameworks, involving a contrast in two kinds of sentences each 
having the parts we call “BE (THING, LOC)”. One kind of 
sentence is “ordinary”, and has the “THING” as ordinary subject. 
This kind of sentence doesn’t have a name except when put in 
contrast with the other kind; this is Babby’s “Declarative 
Sentence”, often called “Locational”, or “Predicational”. It seems 
to be an instance of the Brentano/Marty “categorical judgment”. 
“Existential Sentences” do not have that ordinary structure, but 
what structure they do have is controversial. In some sense they 
turn the predication around and say of the LOC that it has THING 
in it. If LOC is implicit, these are “thetic judgments”.  
Babby (1980) was able to explain a great deal about GenNeg 
using the idea that these two kinds of sentences differ in Theme-
Rheme structure. In “Declarative” sentences, THING is both 
Theme and Subject. In Existential Sentences, THING is part of the 
Rheme; the question of whether it is still surface subject receives a 
chapter in Babby (1980) and is still debated. 
We have become convinced that the crucial distinction is not in 
Theme-Rheme structure but something similar which we call 
“Perspective Structure3.” In Borschev and Partee (to appear), we 
keep some parts of our analysis from Borschev and Partee (1998a), 
but build on Perspective Structure rather than Theme-Rheme 
structure.  
Among the central notions needed for understanding existential 
sentences, Arutjunova (1976) distinguishes three components in a 
“classical” existential sentence: a “Localizer” (“Region of 
existence”, “L” below), a name of an “Existing object” (“EO”), 
and an “Existential Verb” (“EV”): 
                                                 
3 Potentially related distinctions, under a variety of names, may be found in the 
work of Sasse (1987) , Calabrese (1992), and Culicover and Levine (2001). 
    
(4)  V ètom kraju (L)  est’ (EV)  lesa (EO). 
  In that  region  is/are  forests-NOM.M.PL 
  ‘There are forests in that region.’  
We use the terms LOCation, THING, and BE, where BE is our 
proxy for any verb which can be used as an “existential verb”. The 
core principles behind our analysis are as follows.  
(5) “EXISTENCE IS RELATIV E” PRINCIPLE: Existence (in the sense 
relevant to NES’s) is always relative to a LOC(ation). 
Distinctions among different LOCations associated with parts 
of sentence structure and context support GenNeg examples which 
deny the existence of the THING in one LOCation but presuppose 
its existence in “the world” or some other relevant LOCation.  
(6) Common structure of “Existence/location situations”: 
   BE (THING, LOC)  
(7)  PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE: An “existence/location situation” 
may be structured either from the perspective of the THING or 
from the perspective of the LOCation.  
Let us use the term Perspectival Center for the participant chosen 
as the point of departure for structuring the situation. (Our 
Perspectival Center will play the role that “Theme” played for 
Babby (1980).) In (8), we underline the Perspectival Center:  
(8) (a) BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of a 
Locative (“Declarative”) sentence. 
 (b) BE (THING, LOC): structure of the interpretation of an 
Existential sentence. 
(9) PERSPECTIVAL CENTER PRESUPPOSITION: Any Perspectival 
Center must be normally be presupposed to exist.  
When the THING is chosen as Perspectival Center, its 
existence is presupposed, and the sentence speaks of its LOCation 
or other properties. When we choose LOC as Perspectival Center, 
the sentence speaks about what THINGs there are or are not in that 
LOCation and potentially about what is happening in the situation.  
    
Principle (9) allows us to derive the same presuppositions that 
were derived in Borschev and Partee (1998a) from the correlation 
of greater presuppositionality with the Theme of the sentence 
(Hajicová 1973, 1974, 1984), Peregrin 1995, Sgall et al 1986).  
3.2  Perspective vs. Theme-Rheme Structure. 
Perspectival structure is basically a structuring at the model-
theoretic level, like the telic/atelic distinction, or the distinction 
between Agents and Experiencers, properties reflecting cognitive 
structuring of the domains that we use language to talk about. 
Theme-Rheme structure is primarily a matter of information 
structure in discourse. The kind of example which argues that the 
distinction we need for explaining the distribution of GenNeg is 
not standard Theme-Rheme structure is our “kefir example” (10). 
(10) [Ja iskal          kefir.] Kefira           v  magazine ne     bylo. 
   [I  looked-for kefir]  Kefir-GEN.M .SG in store        NEG  was-N.SG 
   ‘[I was looking for kefir.] There wasn’t any kefir in the store.’  
 In (10), kefira ‘kefir’, in the genitive, is nevertheless part of the 
Theme, according to two familiar kinds of evidence: (i) the rules 
governing the interplay of word order and intonation in Russian 
(Kovtunova 1976, Švedova 1980, Yokoyama 1986), and (ii) the 
general principle that the Rheme of one sentence is a favored 
candidate to become the Theme of the following sentence. 
4 The problem of nominative ni-phrases 
4.1 Nominative-genitive alternation in subject ni-phrases 
If GenNeg occurs inside the scope of negation, and nominatives  
outside, we would not expect a negative-concord ni-word to occur 
in the nominative if it meets the conditions for GenNeg, since 
negative-concord ni-words are obligatorily under the scope of 
sentential negation. But both of the following are good4: 
                                                 
4 Thanks to the students in Partee’s seminar at RGGU in Moscow in spring 
2000, especially Masha Frid, Lena Model, Yura Lander, and Zoya Efimova. 
    
(11)   Nikto     tam  ne  byl. 
     NI.who-NOM.M.SG there  NEG was- M.SG 
     ‘No one was there.’ 
(12)     Nikogo    tam  ne   bylo. 
     NI.who-GEN.M.SG  there  NEG was- N.SG 
      ‘No one was there.’  
It seems clear that (11) is a DS and (12a,b) are ES’s; they have 
the same differences in presuppositions, natural contexts, etc. as 
the well-known pair (13a-b) discussed by Apresjan (1980) in 
connection with differences in ‘reference time’, and by Borschev 
and Partee (1998a, 1998b): 
(13)  a. Otec     ne   byl   na  more. 
   Father-NOM.M.SG  NEG was-M.SG  at  sea 
   ‘Father was not at the sea (then / ever in his life).’ 
b. Otca     ne   bylo   na more. 
Father-GEN.M.SG  NEG was-N.SG at  sea 
   ‘Father was not (present) at the sea (on that occasion).’ 
 But nikto in (11), like nikogo in (12), must be in the scope of 
the sentential negation ne. This is the same situation as in 
Peškovskij’s examples in Section 2. Similar examples can be found 
in Babby (1980:66), but the problem they present for “scope of 
negation” analyses is not discussed. Both (11) and (12) must have 
the subject under the scope of sentential negation, so scope of 
negation cannot be directly responsible for Nom/Gen alternation. 
 Although (11) and (12) do not differ in scope of negation, they 
differ in presupposition: the nominative nikto must quantify over a 
known group of individuals, while there is no such requirement for 
the genitive nikogo, just as with Peškovskij’s grosh examples. 
Google searches show that for various word-order variants of the 
sentences Nikto tam ne byl and Nikogo tam ne bylo, the GenNeg 
variant is much more common than the Nominative variant (63 vs. 
2 for a Latin alphabet search in July 2000, hundreds vs. 33 for a 
Cyrillic search in April 2001). The contexts made clear that the 
    
nominative nikto examples found in the Google search were 
explicitly or implicitly partitive: ‘not a single one of a given 
group’, and/or agentive: ‘not a single person had been there (had 
(ever) gone there)’. In all cases the nominatives presuppose the 
existence of a non-empty set of individuals who ‘might have been 
there’, whereas the genitive examples need not. 
4.2 Evidence of presuppositional differences. 
Further examples can shed light on the difference in 
presuppositions between NES’s and NDS’s. According to our 
generalization in (7), the Perspectival Center Presupposition, an 
NES always presupposes the existence of the LOC, while an NDS 
presupposes the existence of the THING. The examples with ni 
odin above suggest that this claim must be refined: it is not the 
referent of the NP itself that is presupposed to exist in the case of a 
quantificational NP, but the domain over which it quantifies. In 
this section we examine these claims by testing further for 
presuppositions of both LOC and THING constituents in the two 
sentence types. 
How can we test for existence presuppositions for LOC? One 
way is by choosing locations like “at the concert”, “at the 
meeting”, locations involving events which could fail to take place.  
(14)  (a)   Petja          na koncerte   ne   byl.                 
        Petja-NOM.M.SG  at the concert NEG  was-M.SG.    
       ‘Petja was not at the concert .’  
    (b) Peti         na koncerte   ne   bylo     
       Petja-GEN.M .SG  at the concert NEG   was-N.SG.   
       ‘Petja was not at the concert .’ 
Sentence (14a) can be felicitously followed by (15), but (14b) 
cannot be, confirming the prediction that the existence of LOC is 
presupposed in an NES but not in an NDS.  
    
(15)   Koncerta  ne  bylo. 
     Concert   NEG was-N.SG  
     ‘There was no concert.’ 
The next examples, with ni odin student ‘not one student’, are 
similar to (11-12). We ask in each case whether the sentence can 
be felicitously fo llowed not only by (15) but also by (16) below. 
(16)   V  našem  gorode  net        studentov. 
     In  our    city    NEG is-N.SG  students-GEN.M.PL 
     ‘There are no students in our city.’ 
(17)  (a) Ni odin       student        na koncerte   ne  
      NI one-NOM.M.SG student-NOM.M.SG at  the concert NEG 
      byl.       OK (15) /  # (16)  
      was-M.SG 
‘Not a single one of the students was at the concert.’  
    (b) Ni odnogo      studenta      na koncerte    ne 
      NI  one-GEN.M.SG  student-GEN.M.SG at  the concert  NEG  
      bylo.    # (15) / OK (16)   
      was-N.SG  
‘There was not a single student [or: not a single one of the 
students] at the concert.’  
Examples (11-12) and (17a-b) are a problem even for Brown 
(1999). Unlike Bailyn (1997), Brown can generate (17a) as well as 
(17b), but she does not predict our observation (C), that (11) and 
(17a), unlike (12) and (17b), are obligatorily “strong”. 
Since the truth conditions of (17a) and (17b) are both in part5 
approximately as in (18), with one student inside the scope of 
negation in either case, scope of negation does not distinguish 
between  NOM and GEN NPs in these examples.  
(18)   NEG  [one (a, a single) student x  [ x was at y]] 
                                                 
5 We omit representation of ‘the/a concert’, for which the truth-conditions 
relative to negation may indeed vary. 
    
The next example is like (14a-b), replacing tam ‘there’ by na 
koncerte ‘at the concert’ so that we can test for presuppositions. 
(19) (a) Nikto       na koncerte  ne   byl.  OK (15)          
      Nobody-NOM  at concert   NEG was-M.SG   
      ‘Nobody was at the concert. There was no concert.’  
   (b) Nikogo      na koncerte   ne   bylo. # (15)  
       Nobody-GEN at concert NEG was-N.SG    
      ‘Nobody was at the concert.  
 Again we find a presupposition of existence of LOC in the 
GenNeg sentence (19b) and not in (19a). As for the subject 
nikto/nikogo, the nominative presupposes the existence of a non-
empty set of people, of whom the sentence says that none were at 
the concert, but (19b) does not. It simply asserts that the concert 
had no audience; the grammar is compatible with the unlikely 
explanation that there are no people at all (in the area). 
 Babby (1980:66) had an example similar to (17a-b): Tam ne 
roslo ni odno derevco / ni odnogo derevca ‘There NEG grew-N.SG. 
NI one-NOM.M.SG tree-NOM.M.SG / NI one-GEN.M.SG tree-GEN.M.SG’ 
‘Not a single tree was growing there’/ ‘There wasn’t a single tree 
growing there.’ He considers this a good example of an NDS/NES 
pair. We agree with his statement that there is a subtle functional 
difference in these near-equivalent statements, but we believe that 
the nominative variant is inconsistent with his analysis. 
One possible response, advocated by Paduceva (1992), is  that 
the verbs are different in such pairs, with nominative signaling an 
agentive use and genitive a non-agentive use (possibly unergative 
vs. unaccusative.) Semantically, it is widely agreed that when the 
same verb may be used in both ES’s and DS’s, it receives a more 
agentive reading in the DS and a more stative reading in the ES 6. It 
                                                 
6 Manfred Krifka (p.c.) suggests that we consider the hypothesis that Agentivity 
requires “perspective on the agent”, and that the phenomena of GenNeg might 
be looked at as related to the puzzling intonational properties of “all-focus” 
sentences like ‘DOGS are barking.’ He suggests looking at “deep ergative 
languages”. 
    
remains an open question whether this difference always reflects 
lexical ambiguity in the verb or may sometimes reflect a structural 
difference, a difference in diathesis, corresponding to choice of 
Perspective in our sense. We remain agnostic so far about the 
syntactic difference that may correspond to difference in choice of 
Perspectival Center, but we believe that it does NOT always 
correlate with scope of negation. 
4.3 Consequences of these examples. 
In the classic examples like (1a-b), it has always seemed that in 
GenNeg constructions we deny the existence of the THING and in 
nominative examples the existence of the THING is presupposed. 
There have always been problems, e.g. in examples with proper 
names. In earlier work we explained those cases by relativizing 
existence claims to particular locations. But the examples with 
nikto/nikogo and ni odin/ ni odnogo raise more serious problems. 
What does seem to be in common in all of the cases, even those 
with nikto and ni odin, is a difference in presuppositions between 
the GenNeg and the Nominative cases. These presuppositions 
seem related to the intuition that the predications are different in 
DS and ES: we predicate something about the Perspectival   
Center, THING or LOC respectively, and that which we predicate 
about should not be empty. The presuppositions sometimes 
concern the “referent” of the THING or LOC expressions (cf. the 
different ‘referential status’ of moroz ‘frost’ in (1a-b)), but may 
concern the domain over which those expressions quantify, if they 
are quantificational. A “presupposition of a non-empty domain” 
seems to be the most defensible generalization. 
Kratzer (p.c.) has pointed out a promising connection of our 
notion of Perspectival Structure with her work on the semantics of 
negation in Kratzer (1989). In Kratzer’s terms, we would argue 
that the evaluation situation for any sentence must be big enough 
to contain the entire universe associated with its Perspectival 
Center. Such a requirement systematically carries a presupposition 
that that universe is not empty. This approach could clarify the 
    
sense in which a nominative subject in an NDS, our Perspectival 
Center, must be “referential” (carries an existence presupposition) 
and yet may be a word like nikto ‘no one’.  
5 A “licensing paradox”: the cego-nibud’ example 
5.1   The examples 
The problematic new example in (20) presents a “licensing 
paradox” that threatens the uncontroversial generalization (B).  
(20) Možet  byt’,  cego-nibud’             u nego net. 
   May  be  ,  something- GEN (non-specif.) at him NEG.is  
   ‘Maybe there is something he doesn’t have.’ 
What makes (20) problematic is GenNeg on a -nibud’ word. 
-Nibud’ words, non-specific indefinites that need (roughly) a non-
veridical context (Pereltsvaig 2000), cannot be licensed by 
clausemate NEG. The distribution of -nibud’ is illustrated in (21). 
Sentence (21a) is judged bad except in an implicitly “modal 
context”; (21b), with its overt modal licenser, is good. And (21c) is 
again bad except in the kinds of “modal contexts” that allow (21a); 
clausemate NEG does not license -nibud’.  
(21)a.(*)Cto-nibud’               u nego est’. 
         something- NOM (non-specific) at him  is  
      [(*) ‘He has something (non-specific).’]  
   b. Možet  byt’, cto-nibud’               u nego est’. 
     May  be,  something- NOM (non-specific) at him  is  
     ‘Maybe he has something.’   
 c. (*)Cego-nibud’             u nego net. 
        something-GEN (non-specific) at him  NEG.is  
 So there are incompatible demands on the form cego-nibud’ in 
(20). GenNeg in (20) must be licensed by its clausemate negation, 
as in the NPI analysis of GenNeg of Pesetsky (1982) and in fact 
any analysis consistent with (B). And yet -nibud’ in (20) must be 
licensed by the higher modal, outside the scope of negation. So 
cego-nibud’ in (20) should be impossible. But it’s fine (e.g., 
    
shopping for a gift for ‘the man who has everything’), and the 
indefinite unambiguously has scope outside the negation.  
The same phenomenon can be found with a higher modal 
taking a lower infinitival clause, as in (22). Examples with higher 
možet byt’ and a finite clause complement are also fine, as in (23). 
(22) Cego-nibud’   moglo  u  nego  ne  byt’.  
   Something-GEN could  at  him  NEG be-INF 
   ‘There could be something he doesn’t have.’ 
(23) Možet  byt’, oni  cego-nibud’    ne  našli. 
   May    be,  they something-GEN NEG found. 
   ‘Maybe there is something they didn’t find.’ 
5.2 Possible LF decomposition of -nibud’ words  
Brown and Franks (1997) and Brown (1999) had already brought 
forward evidence that calls into question the connection between 
“true” scope of negation and the Nom/Gen alternation, pointing 
toward the conclusion that GenNeg may be licensed by “syntactic” 
sentential negation, independently of its semantic/pragmatic 
function.  
… previous analyses of GN have linked its occurrence to 
whether or not the object NP is in the  scope of negation. Our 
data, however, show that GN occurs even when there is no NO 
[Negative Operator], hence, no negative force, hence, no true 
scope of negation. The GN is thus completely divorced from the 
presence of NO. GN seems to require simply a dominating 
NegP, which in Russian will always have a filled head position, 
and which universally will have one when negation is pleonastic. 
Neg P is a necessary and sufficient condition for checking GN. 
(Brown and Franks 1997, p.152, emphasis added) 
They present examples like the following , noting that “in (70) [our 
(24)], negation is forced, in effect, to be pleonastic”(p.154). 
    
(24)   Ne  skazal  li  on cego-nibud’  lišnego? 
     NEG said   Q he [what-any   extra]GEN 
     ‘Had he said too much?’  (their (70), p.154) 
Our examples raise some problems that they did not address, 
including the ‘licensing paradox’ discussed above. One possible 
resolution of the ‘licensing paradox’ posed by (20) is hypothesis 
(D1). On this approach we could suggest that the word cego-nibud’ 
is decomposable into parts with different scopes and different 
licensers. One ‘part’ is licensed by the higher modal (cf. 21b) and 
is outside the scope of negation, and another ‘part’ is marked 
GenNeg in the scope of negation. So (20) might be decomposed 
into a structure similar to that in (25), but details and formal 
semantic interpretation remain to be worked out.  
(25)  Možet  byt’,  est’    cto-nibud’,       
    May  be,   there.is something- NOM (non-specific)  
    cego         u nego net. 
    which-GEN.M.SG  at him NEG.is  
    ‘Maybe there is something that he doesn’t have.’ 
Another possibility, (D2), also for future research, is a more 
fine-grained analysis of the semantic properties of licensers and 
licensees, including presuppositional properties that may inhibit a 
licenser from affecting a potential licensee in its “scope”. 
6 Concluding remarks 
What seems to be “outside the scope of negation” may in some 
cases merely be “immune” to the effect of negation by virtue of 
presuppositions, which may arise from a number of sources, 
including Perspectival Structure. Our examples suggest that 
occurring in the “semantic” scope of negation is not necessary for 
genitive and not impossible for nominative. One crucial set of 
examples relies on the behavior of ni-phrases: if nikto and ni odin 
student are NPIs, and must be in the semantic scope of negation, 
then nominative can be in the semantic scope of negation. Another 
crucial set of examples relies on the behavior of -nibud’-phrases. It 
    
has been argued that they cannot occur in the semantic scope of 
clausemate negation, but we can find them in the genitive form 
where that genitive is apparently indeed (syntactically) licensed by 
clausemate negation.  
In sum: besides supporting the basic scope claims (A-B), we 
have offered novel evidence on the basis of licensing restrictions 
for a possible semantic decomposition (D1-D2), leaving it open 
whether that decomposition should be seen in “structural” terms or 
not. And the difference of interpretation (C) in (17a-b), and in (20) 
and its nominative counterpart (21b), sheds light on 
presuppositional differences in the interpretation of Nom vs. Gen 
forms that do not correspond to differences in scope of negation. 
We have not offered full analyses of these phenomena, but suggest 
that these observations help provide useful new test cases for 
theories of GenNeg. 
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